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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GERARDO L. GONZALES 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20040014-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203, in the First District Court, Box Elder County, the Honorable 
Ben H. Hadfield presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue I: Was the trial testimony and circumstantial evidence (including testimony 
from defendant's girlfriend), sufficient evidence to convict defendant of murder? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court 
"view[s] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H18,10P.3d346. This Court may reverse the 
jury's verdict only if "the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inlierently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.9" Id. at 1J18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 
1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree felony; one count of 
possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor ,(R. 1-2). Before trial, the drug 
charges were severed from the murder charge (R. 32). Thus, defendant was tried solely on 
the murder charge. On November 6,2003, a jury found Defendant guilty of murder (R. 146). 
Defendant was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 151, 154-55). 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 156). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 163). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Fighting About Money 
On Friday morning, March 28, 2003, defendant and his girlfriend Chantelle Sartin, 
were fighting about money (R.168:139-140; R. 169:166,168). The couple, along with their 
two children, had been living in motels in the Logan area for several months (R. 168:119-
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121). Their financial situation was bleak. Their monthly income consisted of $500 in 
welfare benefits, food stamps, and some help from family (R. 168:127, 137). Defendant 
worked occasionally, but had not worked since the middle of March (R. 168:126). Adding 
to their financial burden of caring for two children, the couple spent an average of $40 a 
night to stay in motels, for a monthly average of $1,200 (R. 168:127-128).1 
Hernandez Always Carried Cash 
The victim, Alberto Hernandez, also lived in Logan (R.168:4-5). Although Hernandez 
had lost his left hand, he was still able to maintain employment running a trim saw for Pallets 
of Utah in Logan (R. 167:131; R. 169:63-64). Hernandez carried his wallet attached to his 
belt loop by a chain (R. 168:88; R. 169:49). It was well known among his friends and co-
workers that he always carried large amounts of cash (R. 168:82, 89; R. 169:50, 63, 73). In 
fact, the day before Hernandez disappeared, he cashed a work check for $613.34 (R. 169:68, 
72). 
Friday, March 28, 2003 was the last day that Hernandez showed up for work 
(R: 169:69). After his shift ended, a co-worker dropped Hernandez off at his home between 
10:30 and 11:00 a.m. (R. 168:18). When Hernandez failed to show up for work on Monday, 
his employer was very surprised because Hernandez was 'Very dedicated, on time, prompt" 
and even if he was sick, "he would still show up." (R. 168:64). 
1
 In addition, defendant smoked crystal meth (R. 168:220, R. 172:4). Presumably, 
he also needed money to support his habit. 
4 
Drinking with "Gerardo " 
When Hernandez's co-worker dropped him off on Friday morning, Hernandez said 
that he was going to look for someone to drink with (R. 168:18-20). Hernandez showered, 
changed his clothes, and went to lunch (R. 168:11, R. 169:59). After lunch, a man in a white 
car with a cracked windshield on the passenger's side dropped Hernandez off at his friend 
Jesus Garcia's house (R. 168:55-56). Hernandez told Garcia that the man who dropped him 
off was named "Gerardo" (R. 168:60). Hernandez also told Garcia that he was waiting for 
Gerardo to come back and pick him up and that they were going to go and drink beers 
together at a hotel (R. 168:58-60). Garcia testified that he did not know defendant Gerardo 
Gonzales, but that he looked "very similar to the person that was in the car" that day (R. 
168:64). 
Defendant Left with Hernandez but Returned Alone 
After his fight with Sartin about money, defendant left the motel in his car, an old, 
white, four-door Dodge (R. 168:142-146, and Exhibit 15). Defendant's car was unique 
because of a large spider web crack in the windshield on the passenger's side (R. 168:142-
146). Defendant returned to the motel later that day with Hernandez (R. 168:147, 150). 
Sartin had seen Hernandez before when she and defendant lived in the same apartment 
complex as Hernandez (R. 168:134, 136). Hernandez had also lived with defendant for a 
time, when he and his wife were separated (R. 168:42). 
Defendant asked Sartin to go to the store and buy some beer (R. 168:148). After 
Sartin returned with the beer, defendant and Hernandez left in defendant's car, taking the 
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beer with them (R. 168:151-52). Some time later defendant returned to the motel alone (R. 
168:153). 
"Field" Trip 
After defendant returned to the motel alone, Sartin got a babysitter for the children (R. 
168:153-54). The couple dropped their children off at the babysitter's in the late afternoon 
or early evening (R. 168:164; R. 169:183,197). Defendant and Sartin then drove to a field 
with grass growing in it (R. 168:165-167). Defendant got out of the car, opened the trunk and 
told Sartin "not to look" (R. 168:167-68). Defendant began "messing around" in the trunk 
(R. 168:168). Sartin could feel the car moving from side to side and back and forth (id.). 
Sartin turned around and saw black hair between the side of the car and the trunk (R. 
168:168-69,188). Mr. Hernandez had black hair (R. 168:150). Defendant's hair at the time 
was very short (R. 168:239). When he was arrested, Defendant's head was shaved (R. 
171:41). 
After seeing the black hair, Sartin immediately turned back around and began to cry 
(R. 168:168-69). She then felt the back of the car lift up, like something heavy had been 
removed from the trunk (R. 168:169). Sartin testified that at the time she felt scared and 
remorseful (R. 168:170). Defendant then got back in the car and started to drive out of the 
field (id.). As they left the field, Sartin looked in the rear view mirror and noticed a light 
colored pick-up truck following them (R. 168:170-71). 
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Defendant Suddenly Has Money 
The couple returned to the motel, paid the motel bill in cash, and went shopping (R. 
168:171-72, R. 169:169). After the shopping trip, the coupled picked up their children at 
1:40 a.m. (R. 169:183). The following morning they moved out of the motel, stayed at an 
aunt's house that night, and then checked into a motel in Brigham City (R. 168:180-183). 
Defendant also paid the bills at the motel in Brigham City (R. 168:185). 
A Big Smile on His Face 
At the end of March or beginning of April of 2003, Ross and Bonnie Rudd were in 
their white pick-up truck checking on some of their property in the Plymouth area (R. 169:5, 
8, 13). In the afternoon, the Rudds saw a white car in a field owned by Randall Udy (R. 
169:7, 31). Mr. Rudd positioned his truck at the opening of the Udy field so that the car 
would have to pass by them in order to leave (R. 169:9). As the car passed the Rudds on its 
way out of the field, the Rudds saw an Hispanic male with a big smile on his face driving the 
car and a female passenger with her head ducked down (R. 169:9-10, 27, 36). The Rudds 
noticed that the car was older, "box style" and had 4-doors (R. 169:10, 36). The Rudds 
followed the car for a distance, but were unable to keep up and soon lost sight of the car (R. 
169:11). Mr. Rudd was going 40 mph, and he thought the white car was going 60 or 70 mph 
A Body in the Field 
On April 12, 2003, Jacob Udy and some friends were helping Jacob's dad, Randall 
Udy, with some work on their field, east of a little town called Plymouth (R. 167: 140,143, 
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169:151-152). This was the same field where the Rudds had seen the white car a couple of 
weeks earlier (R. 169:6,155-156). The field was not being farmed, so there was only grass 
growing in it (R. 169:158-159). While Jacob and his friends were driving a tractor around 
the field they discovered Hernandez's dead body (R. 167:161; R. 169:152). 
The Medical Examiner determined that the cause of death was blunt force trauma to 
the back of the head that shattered his skull (R. 167:117-19, 121, 132). The damage to 
Hernandez's head was so severe that his skull would easily depress if someone were to touch 
it (R. 168:117). In addition to the head injuries, Hernandez also had a number of post 
mortem injuries, including a leg that was so severely broken that the bone was protruding 
through the skin (R. 167:115,122). The medical examiner also determined that Hernandez's 
blood alcohol level was .05 (R. 167:125). 
When his body was discovered, a small metal clip, was still attached to his belt loop, 
but Hernandez's wallet was missing, along with his characteristic wad of cash (R. 167:154-
57). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A review of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, establishes that there was sufficient evidence to convict 
defendant of murder. From the testimony and evidence, the jury could determine and infer 
that defendant knew Hernandez, and met up with him to drink beer the day he disappeared. 
Defendant murdered Hernandez by bashing in the back of his head. He then put Hernandez 
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in the trunk of his car and dumped his body in the Udy's field. Defendant also stole 
Hernandez's wallet and the cash that was in it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove him 
guilty of murder (Br. Aplt. at 25). Defendant alleges a lack of physical evidence connecting 
him to the murder, and claims that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to convict 
him (id. at 26, 29). Defendant also points to what he believes are troubling aspects of the 
case, especially some of Chantelle Sartin's testimony (id. at 29-38). 
Defendant's argument tocuses on and emphasizes favorable testimony and evidence 
but ignores or discounts inculpatory facts, testimony, and evidence. An appellate court 
"review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury" and reverses "only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,124 (Utah 1989). "The 
existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences do not warrant disturbing the 
jury's verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
As the appellant, defendant also has the burden of marshaling all the evidence 
supporting the jury verdict, including all reasonable inferences, and then demonstrating that 
even viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is insufficient. State v. Coonce, 
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2001 UT App 355, ^ 6, 36 P.3d 533, 536; andseeStatev. Martinez, 2002UT App 126440, 
47 P.3d 115, 124. Defendant's review and analysis of the evidence that is favorable to him 
does not constitute complete marshaling. That is reason alone for rejecting his insufficiency 
challenge. 
But even if defendant had marshaled the evidence, defendant has not shown that the 
evidence was insufficient. As stated, this Court must "view[ ] the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, ^ 18, 10 P.3d 346. It may reverse a jury verdict only if "the evidence 4s sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. at 1118 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1992)); see also State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah 
App 1991); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, U 42, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
344 (Utah 1997); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1986); State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 
875, 875 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, u[w]hen findings of all required elements of the crime can be reasonably made 
from the evidence, including the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, [appellate 
courts] stop their inquiry and sustain the verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H42. An appellate 
court "will not lightly overturn a jury verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, U 42; see also State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (holding a defendant claiming insufficient evidence "faces a high 
hurdle in establishing this claim"). 
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An appellate court also "will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the jury's verdict 
unless the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 
UT 4, K 23, 20 P.3d 265. Moreover, it "is within the exclusive province of the jury to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence." State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 
244, f 11, 54 P.3d 645 (quotations and citation omitted). 
A. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt. 
As defendant argues, this case was mainly based on circumstantial evidence. But "it 
is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt 
of the accused." Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126; see also Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (holding that "a 
conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence"). 
''Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of such 
quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
is sufficient to sustain the conviction." Nickles, 728 P.2d at 127; see also State v. Span, 819 
P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (same). 
Indeed, circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain murder convictions in the 
following Utah cases: State v. Brown, 948 P.2d337,344 (Utah 1997) ("The State's case was 
based solely on circumstantial evidence. However, a conviction can be based on sufficient 
circumstantial evidence."); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah App. 1995) (citing 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)) ("It is well accepted that 'circumstantial 
evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the accused.'"); State v. 
11 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, 1} 41, 52 P.3d 1194 ("evidence connecting Fedorowicz to 
Rebecca's fatal injuries is largely, if not completely, circumstantial" but court will affirm so 
long as circumstantial evidence is sufficient); State v Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, ^  42,47 
P.3d 115 (to determine whether evidence supported the verdict, court looks to "circumstantial 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom"); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 
355, Tf 6, 36 P.3d 533 (defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings 
and then "demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings"); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 67,27 P.3d 
1115 ("So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry 
stops"); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 21, 10 P.3d 346 ("intent can be proven by circum-
stantial evidence"). 
Thus, to decide whether sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, this Court must 
determine only "(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of 
the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have 
a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 948 P.2d at 344. 
B. The evidence was sufficient to establish Defendant's 
guilt. 
To prove that defendant murdered Hernandez, the prosecution had to establish beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of 
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Hernandez (R. 115). Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the jury could 
logically and reasonably determine or infer that: 
• The defendant desperately needed money. Defendant and his girlfriend 
fought about money on the day that Hernandez disappeared, and their 
income did not meet their expenses (R. 168:127-28, 137, 139-40,220; 
R. 169:166, 168). 
• Mr. Hernandez was carrying cash on the day he was murdered. He had 
just cashed a work check the day before, and he was well known for 
always carrying large amounts of cash (R. 168:82, 89; 169:50, 63, 68, 
72, 73). 
Defendant knew Mr. Hernandez because they used to live in the same 
apartment complex, and they even lived together for a time (R. 168:42, 
134, 136). 
On March 28th, defendant and Hernandez were together. Defendant 
dropped Hernandez off at his friend Jesus Garcia's house (R. 168:55-
56, 60, 64). Defendant picked Hernandez up later to go and drink beer 
(R. 168:60). 
Defendant brought Hernandez back to his motel room, where he was 
seen by Sartin (R. 168:147). 
• Sartin bought beer for defendant and Hernandez (R. 168:148). 
• Defendant and Hernandez left together in defendant's car with the beer 
(R. 168:151-52). Hernandez drank some of the beer. When the 
medical examiner performed the autopsy, he determined that 
Hernandez's blood alcohol level was .05 (R. 167:125). 
• Defendant murdered Hernandez by bashing him in the head. The 
medical examiner determined that the cause of death was blunt force 
trauma to the back of the head that shattered his skull (R. 167:117-19, 
121, 132). 
• Defendant stole Hernandez's wallet and money. When Hernandez's 
body was discovered, the small metal clip was still attached to his belt 
loop, but his wallet with its characteristic wad of cash was missing (R. 
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167:154-57). Defendant suddenly had cash, which he spent on motel 
bills and items purchased at Walmart (R. 168:171, 172, R. 169:169). 
• Defendant put Hernandez's body in the trunk of his car (R. 168:168-
69). Defendant and Sartin drove out to a field in the Plymouth area (R. 
168:165-167; 169:5,8, 13,31). 
• Defendant took Hernandez's body from the trunk of his car and 
dumped it in the field (R. 168:168-170). Sartin saw black hair between 
the side of the car and the trunk (R. 168:168-69, 188). Hernandez had 
black hair (R. 168:150). Sartin felt the back of the car lift up, like 
something heavy was removed from the trunk (R. 168:169). 
• Defendant and Sartin were seen leaving the field by the Rudds (R. 
169:9, 10, 27, 36). 
Based on the testimony and evidence presented in this case, the jury could logically 
and reasonably infer that defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of 
Hernandez. 
Defendant nevertheless suggests that the evidence was not sufficient because Sartin's 
testimony was unreliable. He argues that Sartin's testimony "should be entirely discarded 
as it was the product of coercion." (Br. Aplt. at 25). Although defendant makes these 
arguments in his appellate brief, he never moved to suppress Sartin's testimony at trial as 
being unreliable. 
While the police tactics used to get Sartin to cooperate may not have been a model of 
good police behavior, those tactics did not render Sartin's testimony so inherently improbable 
that no reasonable juror could have believed it. 
Defendant alleges that Sartin only agreed with the police, and that "she couldn't give 
any details on her own." (Br. Aplt. at 36). But the most significant details came from Sartin, 
and could only have been known by her and defendant. Sartin testified that defendant got 
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out of the car, opened the trunk and told her "not to look." (R. 168:167-68). Sartin turned 
around and saw black hair between the side of the car and the trunk (R. 168:168-69, 188). 
Sartin felt the back of the car lift up, like something heavy had been removed from the trunk 
(R. 168:169). The police never suggested these details to Sartin. 
Moreover, Sartin's testimony fit with and was corroborated by all the other 
circumstantial evidence. First, Jesus Garcia testified that Hernandez told him that the friend 
who dropped him off in the white car with the cracked windshield was named Gerardo (R. 
168:55-56, 60). Defendant looked "very similar to the person that was in the car." (R. 
168:64). Hernandez also said he was going to go drink beer with Gerardo at a hotel (R. 
168:58-60). 
Sartin testified that their car had a cracked windshield (R. 168:144). She also testified^ 
that defendant returned to the motel with a man that she had seen previously when they lived 
in an apartment complex known as "Little Mexico." (R. 168:134,136,147,150). Hernandez 
had previously lived in "Little Mexico." (R. 168:42). Sartin bought beer for them, and 
defendant and Hernandez left with the beer (R. 168:149, 151-52). 
Second, the Rudds testified that they saw an Hispanic male and a white female driving 
a white, four-door car in the Udy's field (R. 169:7,31,9-10,27,36). The Rudds were driving 
a white pick-up truck (R. 169:8). When the white car left the field, the Rudds tried to follow 
(R. 169:11). The field was not being farmed, so only grass was growing in it (R. 169:158-
59). 
Sartin testified that defendant drove out to a grassy field (R. 168:165-76). He lifted 
something heavy from the trunk, and she saw black hair between the side of the car and the 
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trunk(R. 168:168-69,188). When they left the field, Sartin saw a light colored pick-up truck 
following them (R. 168:170-71). When viewed in light of all the other circumstantial 
evidence, Sartin's testimony was not inherently improbable. In fact, her testimony fit 
perfectly with the other evidence. 
Finally, the jury heard all about the police tactics and behavior that defendant claims 
rendered Sartin's testimony unreliable. The jury heard lengthy testimony about and watched 
videos of the interviews with Sartin (R. 168:95-108, 186-87, 190-205, 217-219, 233). Part 
of the defense strategy was to point out what they believed were the problems with Sartin's 
statements and testimony (R. 168:190-205, 217-219, 233, R. 171:50-55). 
Despite that evidence, the jury believed Sartin's testimony. As explained, the 
evidence was sufficient for the jury to decide that defendant was guilty of murdering Mr. 
Hernandez. The jury's verdict was not "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime." 
Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, at 1J 23. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was insufficient to support his conviction. 
Therefore, his conviction should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth above, the State asks this Court to affirm the 
conviction and sentence of defendant Gonzales. 
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Addendum A 
V&stJaw 
UT ST § 76-5-203 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-203 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*I Chapter 5. Offenses Against The Person 
*i! Part 2. Criminal Homicide 
-+§ 76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b 
18 
(c 
(d 
(e 
(f 
(g 
(h 
(i 
(J 
(k 
(1 
(m 
(n 
(o 
(P 
(q 
(r 
child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 
years of age; 
kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
child kidnapping under Section 7 6-5-301.1; 
aggravated kidnapping under Section 7 6-5-302; 
rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
object rape of a child under Section 7 6-5-402.3; 
sodomy upon a child under Section 7 6-5-403.1; 
forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 
76-5-404.1; 
rape under Section 76-5-402; 
object rape under Section 7 6-5-402.2; 
forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
arson under Section 76-6-102; 
aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
burglary under Section 7 6-6-202; 
aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UT ST § 76-5-203 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-203 
Page 2 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, 
the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or 
is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in 
the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from 
the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate 
offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under 
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is 
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established 
under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder 
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of 
another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UT ST § 76-5-203 Page 3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-203 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; 
or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4) (a) (i) or 
the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4) (a) (ii) shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-203; Laws 1975, c. 53, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 83, § 2; 
Laws 1979, c. 74, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 157, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 227, § 1; Laws 
1991, c. 10, § 9; Laws 1996, c. 123, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1999, c. 2, § 
2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 90, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 101, 
§ 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2000, c. 125, § 3, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 
146, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 146, inserted subsec. (2) (d) (iii) . 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-203, UT ST § 76-5-203 
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Copr. © West Group 2004. All right reserved. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
